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Abstract This paper uses a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with sto-
chastic marginal benefits from a public good to examine the effect of imperfect informa-
tion on contributions. Estimates of individual risk preferences are obtained using data from
second-price auctions over lotteries. The results show that limited information about the
value of the public good significantly lowers average contributions in all periods but the
last. Moreover, the results support the interpretation that subjects bid “as if” they were risk
averse, and suggest that “as if” risk-averse behavior is negatively correlated with willingness
to contribute.
Keywords Public goods experiments · Second-price auctions · Imperfect information ·
Risk
JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D80 · H41
1 Introduction
A significant body of literature on linear public goods games has accumulated in the last
20 years. One reason for this enduring interest is that, although such games are usually pa-
rameterized to create a social dilemma (Dawes 1980), a large percentage of participants in
public goods experiments are found to voluntarily cooperate. In repeated settings, however,
contributions decline over time and reach their minimum when the interaction terminates
(see Ledyard 1995 for a review). These findings have stimulated research aimed at explain-
ing the observed behavior and ascertaining features of the institution or environment that
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may influence it. This paper focuses on two related features: the information conveyed to
the agents and their “as if” risk preferences.1
Most previous experimental studies have been performed in a rich informational environ-
ment in which the public good’s value was common knowledge. Yet, in real life, a person
hardly knows in advance the marginal benefits she can derive from a public good she is
asked to finance. Public goods normally are supplied after contributions are made, and thus
initial contributors do not know a priori the value of the good. The question can therefore be
raised as to whether or not the voluntary cooperation typically observed in linear contribu-
tion mechanisms would endure in a world of imperfect information about the public good’s
value.
The experiment reported here is designed to address this question. A linear voluntary
contribution mechanism is tested under two informational environments. Under perfect in-
formation (henceforth, PI-treatment), the marginal value of the public good is certain and
known to all. This condition is similar to those used in previous studies. Under imperfect
information (henceforth, II-treatment), the marginal benefit from the public good can take
one of two (equiprobable) values, and each subject knows these values and their probability
distribution.
By implementing two information conditions this paper is connected to a (small) strand
of experimental literature that considers the effect of incomplete information on contribu-
tions. In an asymmetric step level public goods experiment, van Dijk and Grodzka (1992)
find no difference in contribution levels between subjects who know only their own endow-
ment and subjects who also know the endowments of the others. In a similar vein, van Dijk
et al. (1999) find that the overall (group) averages in their complete and partial informa-
tion conditions are very similar. Marks and Croson (1999) analyze a provision point game
where subjects have incomplete information about the valuations of others, and report no
significant difference in the level of group contributions between information conditions.2
All these experiments assume private information. This paper moves a step further and sup-
poses that one does not know her own marginal benefit from the public good, but she is
informed that it can take one of two values with the same probability.
The stochastic value adds an element of risk to the standard public goods setting, thereby
allowing one to explore whether, and to what extent, the presence of risk affects the usu-
ally observed behavioral patterns. To make the two treatments comparable, the parameters
are chosen such that the Nash equilibrium and the efficient outcome are corner solutions,
opposite to each other, both when the information is perfect and when it is imperfect and
participants are risk-neutral. Thus, under risk-neutrality, behavior should not differ between
treatments.
1The phrase “as if” is used to acknowledge that experimenters cannot actually observe the subjects’ pref-
erence characteristics. They can only estimate values for their risk preference parameters using, sometimes,
specific expected utility models. This work does not claim that the calculated parameter values capture ‘true’
preferences or that a particular specification of the utility function is the only possible representation of risky
choice. With readers’ understanding, in the rest of the paper, behavior consistent with risk aversion (risk
loving) will be referred to as risk-averse (risk-loving) behavior.
2On theoretical grounds, it is worth mentioning the studies by Gradstein et al. (1994) and Menezes et al.
(2001). Gradstein et al. investigate the robustness of the neutrality theorem when an individual does not know
the others’ income, and find that attaining neutrality is more difficult with incomplete information. Menezes
et al. confirm the superiority of subscription games over contribution games in the presence of incomplete
information about the others’ valuations of the public good.
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However, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989, p. 585) suggest that a lack of information, as cre-
ated in the II-treatment, may lower individuals’ willingness to contribute.3 Furthermore,
Ledyard (1995, p. 143) lists risk aversion among the systematic variables which may shape
contributions levels, and acknowledges that its effect has not been tested. To the best of
our knowledge, the relation between “as if” risk attitudes and willingness to contribute has
remained largely unexplored, although there is some literature that comes close to the is-
sue. For instance, in a non-linear public goods game involving risk about one’s own and/or
another person’s marginal benefit from the public good, Brennan et al. (2008) find that con-
tributions are, on average, decreasing in both the own and the other’s risk.4 Walker and
Halloran (2004) investigate a one shot voluntary contribution mechanism in which the im-
position of rewards or sanctions (a “nested” public good) is uncertain. Their study reveals
that uncertainty about reward or sanction does not alter behavior as compared to a setting
with certain rewards and sanctions and to a baseline treatment with no sanction and no re-
ward.
Due to the crucial role of risk preferences in our setup, it is important to estimate val-
ues for subjects’ risk preference parameters. To do so, individual valuations of ten risky
prospects are elicited using an incentive-compatible second-price auction prior to the public
goods game.5 Valuations are defined as reservation prices that a person is willing to pay to
buy the prospect.
Section 2 provides details of the experimental procedures and treatments. Section 3 re-
ports the results of the experiment. Section 4 summarizes our central findings and concludes.
2 The experiment
The computerized experiment was performed at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in
Jena (Germany). The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher
2007). Participants were undergraduate students from different disciplines at the University
of Jena.
In total, two experimental sessions were run, each involving 32 participants, and imple-
menting one of the two treatments (between-subjects design). Each session consisted of two
different experiments. First, subjects participated in a series of second-price auctions. They
then played a repeated linear public goods game under either perfect or imperfect infor-
mation. The instructions distributed at the beginning informed participants that they would
take part in two separate experiments, and explained the rules of the first experiment only.
Written instructions on the second experiment were distributed at the end of the first one
(a translation of the German instructions for the two experiments is available upon request).
In both experiments amounts were denoted by ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), where
3Actually, Bagnoli and Lipman have in mind a voluntary contribution mechanism for the provision of thresh-
old public goods.
4Brennan et al.’s paper differs from the current study in that it examines the relationship between other-
regarding concerns and attitudes toward “social” risk in experiments involving choices with and without
strategic interaction.
5The second-price auction is a market institution that should induce subjects to reveal their true values (for
examples of its application see Shogren et al. 1994; Di Mauro and Maffioletti 2004). Other approaches to
measuring risk preference parameters are the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, the binary lottery tech-
nique, and the paired lottery-choice task.
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Table 1 Experimental lotteries
Note: EV and σ 2 denote,
respectively, expected value and
variance. θ is the probability of
the low outcome L
PI-treatment II-treatment
L = 75 H = 175 L = 40 H = 220
θ EV σ 2 θ EV σ 2
0.8 95 1600 0.55 121 8019
0.5 125 2500 0.7 94 6804
0.55 120 2475 0.55 121 8019
0.6 115 2400 0.6 112 7776
0.65 110 2275 0.65 103 7371
0.7 105 2100 0.7 94 6804
0.75 100 1875 0.75 85 6075
0.8 95 1600 0.8 76 5184
0.85 90 1275 0.85 67 4131
0.9 85 900 0.9 58 2916
10 ECU = €1. In order to avoid portfolio-diversification effects, participants in each ses-
sion/treatment were paid according to one choice only.6 The average payoff, earned in about
1½ hours, was €11.7 (including a show-up fee of €2.50).
2.1 The second-price auctions
The first experiment collects data from a series of second-price auctions so as to estimate in-
dividual risk preference parameters. Each participant submits the maximum integer amount
she is willing to pay to acquire a lottery yielding a payoff of L or H (0 < L < H) with
probabilities θ and 1 − θ , respectively. Each player must bid on 10 lotteries, being aware
that the right to play each lottery is granted to the highest bidder at a price equal to the sec-
ond highest bid. Table 1 lists the set of implemented lotteries separately for each treatment.
To simplify the task, the probabilities attached to the two possible payoffs are presented not
only numerically but also graphically in the form of pie charts.
The low (high) payoff L(H) attainable in each lottery-set is chosen so as to equalize the
minimum (maximum) payoff achievable in the subsequent public goods game. In this way,
risk preferences refer always to the same expected wealth. This is important as risk attitudes
may vary with wealth (Rabin and Thaler 2001).
For each auction, participants receive an endowment of 100 ECU. Yet, due to some ex-
pected values exceeding 100 (see Table 1), participants are informed that bids can be higher
than their own endowment, and thus paid out of their own pockets.7 No feedback about the
ten lotteries is provided until the end of the experimental session. Only after playing the
public goods game is each subject informed of each lottery’s highest and second highest
bid as well as of whether or not she wins that lottery. If one of the lotteries is randomly
chosen for payment, the subject who submitted the highest bid pays the second highest bid
and acquires the right to play out that lottery so that her payments are contingent on the
6The following random lottery incentive system was used. First, one of the two experiments was selected at
random, with both experiments being equally likely. Then, depending on whether the random device selected
the first or second experiment, either one of the 10 lotteries or one of the 10 periods was randomly picked up,
where all lotteries/periods were equally likely.
7Note that subjects can actually experience losses only if their bids exceed 125 (i.e., endowment plus partic-
ipation fee) plus the worse outcome of the lottery.
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lottery’s outcome. All other subjects earn their initial endowment. Under the assumption
of separability (implying that each auction is seen as an independent event), this random
lottery incentive mechanism gives subjects the appropriate motivation to reveal their true
preferences in each auction.8
2.2 The public goods game
The second experiment investigates the impact of imperfect information on contributions.
To achieve this aim, it relies on the standard linear public goods game as introduced by Isaac
et al. (1984).
Groups of size two interact for 10 periods in a partners design.9 In any one period, each
participant is endowed with 100 ECU and must decide privately how much to contribute to a
public good, keeping the remaining ECU for herself. Let ci denote individual i’s contribution
to the public good (with ci = {1,2,3, . . . ,100}, i = 1,2), and let C = c1 + c2 be the total
amount of public good provided. The monetary payoff of each i is given by
Ui(ci,C) = 100 − ci + αC,
where α is i’s marginal benefit from the public good.
In the PI-treatment, subjects are told that α is fixed at 0.75; this is the control treatment.10
In the II-treatment, subjects are informed that α can be either a = 0.4 or a = 1.1, with proba-
bility ½ each. Notice that the expected marginal benefit from the public good is kept constant
across treatments to focus solely on the effects of imperfect information, although the two
values of α in the II-treatment (and, thus, the parameterized marginal payoffs) provide the
players with opposite incentives for (not) contributing.
To avoid confounding effects due to asymmetric marginal benefits, the value of α is
simultaneously determined for both members of a pair, and subjects know this. In both
treatments, at the end of each period, participants get feedback on their partner’s contribution
and their private payoff. In the II-treatment, subjects are also informed about the randomly
chosen α-value in their own pair.
A risk-neutral player facing our parameters should contribute zero in both treatments if
she is strictly self-interested, while she should always fully contribute if she is efficiency-
oriented (i.e., wants to maximize the sum of U1 and U2). However, in the II-treatment, the
induced (unobserved) marginal benefit, αi , to risk-averse or risk-loving agent i may be such
8We acknowledge Holt’s (1986) and Karni & Safra’s (1987) critique according to which subjects consider
the whole experiment as a single decision problem, thereby choosing a set of optimal answers given their
preference functional. However, in the setting under investigation, such a behavior would require a high
degree of sophistication. Additionally, Cubitt et al. (1998) show that the random lottery incentive mechanism
does work properly.
9It was desired to make the two treatments equivalent under risk-neutrality and, at the same time, to have
α-parameters inducing opposite material incentives in the II-treatment. Groups of minimal size reach these
objectives without departing too much from the typical marginal efficiency gains (of 1.6) attainable through
cooperation in case of perfect information. Had the design considered, for instance, four-person game, the
α-parameters in II could not have been between 0.3 and 1 to yield opposite predictions. However, values of,
e.g., 0.1 and 1.1 in II would have implied a marginal return of 0.6 per person (a total of 2.4 for the group)
in PI. It is well-known (Rapoport and Chammah 1965) that larger relative payoffs from mutual cooperation
compared to mutual defection can affect behavior considerably.
10The choice of α = 0.75 in PI is based on former two-person public goods experiments, such as Coricelli et
al. (2004), González et al. (2005), and Staffiero (2006), which rely on marginal values of 0.8, 0.7, and 0.75,
respectively.
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to eliminate the dilemma.11 Let CEi be i’s certainty equivalent for the risky payoff, meaning
that receiving CEi for sure is equally preferable to the prospect of receiving either 100 −
ci + aC or 100 − ci + aC with probability ½ each. The more risk-averse (risk-loving) agent
i is, the lower (the higher) will be her CEi . In the public goods context under investigation,
the certainty equivalent can be expressed as CEi = 100 − ci + αiC. Thus, for given ci and
cj (j = 1,2; j = i), a lower/higher CEi implies a lower/higher induced αi . If agent i is
risk-averse and her CEi corresponds to a payoff with αi < 0.5, then i should contribute zero
both if she is interested only in her own monetary payoff and if she cares about efficiency.
Similarly, if i is risk-loving and her CEi corresponds to αi > 1, then i should contribute
her whole endowment if she is either self-interested or efficiency-minded. It is therefore
necessary to identify whether the subjects’ “as if” risk preference parameters are such to
induce αi -values that rule out the dilemma in the II-treatment.
Suppose that agent i has a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function
defined over material payoffs of the form Vi = Urii , where (1 − ri) is i’s index of relative
risk aversion (see, e.g., Wakker 2008). Then, if agent i in the II-treatment contributes ci to
the public good and believes that her partner contributes bi , her expected utility is:
Vi = 12 (100 − ci + 0.4(ci + bi))
ri + 1
2
(100 − ci + 1.1(ci + bi))ri .
Consider now a hypothetical public goods game paying a deterministic payoff equal to
the certainty equivalent CEi , where bi replaces cj . Given ci and bi , i’s utility from this
hypothetical public good would be:
V ui = (100 − ci + αi(ci + bi))ri .
Setting Vi = V ui and solving for αi , one gets:
αi = [0.5(100 − 0.6ci + 0.4bi)
ri + 0.5(100 + 0.1ci + 1.1bi)ri ] 1r i − 100 + ci
ci + bi . (1)
For specific ci and bi , (1) allows an assessment of whether, given her risk preference
parameter estimates, subject i considers the public goods game with stochastic marginal
benefits as equivalent to a deterministic game with αi ∈ (0.5,1), thereby confronting the
dilemma.
Estimations of αi using (1) require knowing i’s expectations about her partner’s con-
tributions. Consequently, in each period of both treatments subjects are asked to predict
how many ECUs their partner will contribute in the current period. To encourage subjects
to report truthful beliefs, a bonus of €15 is paid to the participant with the most accurate
predictions in each session.12
Eliciting expectations about the other’s contributions also allows the investigation of
whether subjects behave conditionally cooperative, in the sense that they contribute more,
11One ought to distinguish, in the II-treatment, between the parameterized marginal benefits (namely, 0.4
and 1.1) and the induced marginal benefits to a risk-averse or risk-loving agent, which may lie anywhere
between 0.4 and 1.1.
12Previous research in experimental economics has shown that the mere act of eliciting beliefs about the
others’ actions can affect behavior in finitely repeated public goods games (see, e.g., Croson 2000; Gächter
and Renner 2006). As beliefs are elicited in our two treatments, this caveat applies to both of them, thereby
leaving unaffected their comparison.
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the more others (are expected to) contribute. Several experiments, all performed under per-
fect information conditions, reveal that conditional cooperation is important (see, e.g., Keser
and van Winden 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Levati and Neugebauer 2004). This study
allows one to examine whether imperfect information about the public good’s value affects
beliefs and/or the relationship usually detected between beliefs and actions.13
3 Results
We start our analysis by classifying subjects according to their risk attitudes, based on their
bids in the second-price auctions. We then proceed to examine contribution levels in the two
public goods treatments so as to investigate whether and how contributions are affected by
the different information conditions. Finally, we examine the relationship between individ-
uals’ contribution behavior and our estimates of their risk preference parameters.
3.1 Risk attitude estimates
To assess each subject’s “as if” risk attitudes, we calculate her local absolute risk aversion
coefficient, as originally proposed by Pratt (1964). The advantage of this method is that it
does not rely on a specific functional form for the utility function.
Define π(x, z˜) to be the risk premium a decision maker is willing to pay out of her non-
stochastic wealth x to avoid a risky prospect z˜. Formally, the decision maker is indifferent
between z˜ and E(z˜) − π(x, z˜), i.e., receiving π(x, z˜) less than the expected value of the
lottery. If her utility function is u, one can write u(x +E(z˜)−π(x, z˜)) = E{u(x + z˜)}. Pratt
(1964) shows that expanding u around x on both sides of the latter expression and equal-
izing the two expansions yields ρ(x) = π(x,z˜)−o(σ 2z )0.5σ 2z , where σ
2
z is the variance of the risky
prospect, and, in expansions, o() means “terms of smaller order than”.
We use the ratio above to estimate the subject’s attitudes to risk. Omitting o(σ 2z ), we can
easily assess the variance σ 2z of each lottery and the risk premium π(x, z˜). In particular, for
each lottery z˜ and each subject, π(x, z˜) is calculated as the difference between the expected
value of z˜ and the subject’s elicited willingness to pay for z˜. A coefficient ρ equal to 0
indicates risk neutrality, whereas a coefficient greater (smaller) than zero is suggestive of
risk aversion (proneness). Tables 2 and 3 list the average (over the 10 lotteries) risk aversion
coefficient ρ of each individual subject for the PI- and the II-treatment, respectively.
Thirty (29) out of 32 participants in the II- (PI-)treatment behave as risk-averse economic
agents; the remaining 2 (3) participants appear risk-loving. In sum, the following result
corroborates earlier experimental evidence (see, e.g., Holt and Laury 2002; Dohmen et al.
2006):
Result 1 In both sessions/treatments, more than 90% of subjects bid as if they were risk-
averse.
Our next step is to use (1) to infer the induced marginal benefits to participants in the II-
treatment. To do so, we need to estimate the numerical values of ri using certainty equivalent
data. As subjects’ responses are typically affected by errors (Hey and Orme 1994), we add
13Previous experimental studies measuring the correlation between beliefs and contributions include
González et al. (2005), Fischbacher and Gächter (2006), and Neugebauer et al. (2008).
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Table 2 Individual estimates of
ρ in the PI-treatment
(estimations based on
Arrow-Pratt measure)
Subject ρ Subject ρ
1 0.05374 17 0.03530
2 0.01380 18 0.10693
3 −0.03722 19 0.06754
4 0.05699 20 0.01657
5 0.04993 21 0.03982
6 0.00429 22 0.03790
7 0.05814 23 0.05548
8 0.05740 24 0.03415
9 0.07223 25 0.10766
10 −0.00089 26 0.11637
11 0.05462 27 0.08490
12 0.06553 28 0.10830
13 0.05840 29 0.03399
14 −0.00332 30 0.05562
15 0.02759 31 0.10675
16 0.08148 32 0.02915
Table 3 Individual estimates of
ρ in the II-treatment (estimations
based on Arrow-Pratt measure)
Subject ρ Subject ρ
1 0.02479 17 0.01817
2 0.02237 18 0.01455
3 0.00936 19 0.01979
4 0.01865 20 0.01834
5 0.01940 21 0.01591
6 0.00701 22 0.01538
7 0.01320 23 0.01650
8 0.02102 24 0.01465
9 0.01947 25 0.02216
10 0.01980 26 0.01657
11 −0.00375 27 0.01610
12 0.01592 28 0.01619
13 0.01397 29 0.00919
14 0.01741 30 0.01756
15 0.01617 31 0.01584
16 −0.00473 32 0.02170
a normally distributed (with mean 0 and variance 1) error term to the CRRA utility function
(V ∗i = Vi + εi). To derive the estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficient (1 − ri),
we use maximum likelihood methods.14
14See Hey and Orme (1994), Hey et al. (2006), and Morone and Schmidt (2008) for details about this esti-
mation technique.
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Table 4 Individual estimates of
ri and αi in the II-treatment
(estimations via maximum
likelihood)
Subject ri αi Subject ri αi
1 1.053 0.748 17 0.729 0.738
2 0.949 0.745 18 0.999 0.750
3 0.856 0.744 19 0.736 0.746
4 0.629 0.734 20 0.677 0.745
5 0.826 0.736 21 0.890 0.748
6 0.758 0.733 22 0.632 0.744
7 0.923 – 23 0.723 0.731
8 0.798 0.748 24 0.831 0.737
9 0.954 0.749 25 0.603 0.726
10 0.731 0.747 26 0.651 0.730
11 1.093 0.750 27 0.731 0.746
12 0.997 0.750 28 0.714 0.745
13 0.676 0.744 29 0.656 0.724
14 0.781 0.748 30 0.659 0.722
15 0.910 0.745 31 0.753 –
16 1.290 0.750 32 0.670 0.748
Table 4 reports individual estimates of ri and αi using data from the II-treatment.15 Two
subjects’ αi cannot be computed because their contributions (ci ) and their beliefs about the
other’s contributions (bi ) are equal to zero in all periods. The estimated ri of the remaining
30 participants imply (given their ci and their bi ) αi -values between 0.72 and 0.75. We can
therefore state:
Result 2 In the II-treatment, almost 94% of the subjects seem to consider the stochastic
public goods game as equivalent to a hypothetical public goods game with deterministic
marginal benefits close to 0.75. Hence, they face the standard conflict between their own
and the group’s interest.
Before turning to the analysis of contribution behavior, we examine the “consistency” of
individual decisions across lotteries by focusing on the decision maker’s certainty-equivalent
ratios (CER), i.e., her willingness to pay for a lottery divided by that lottery’s expected value
(see, e.g., Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992, 1994; Shupp and Williams 2008).16 A ratio equal
to unity indicates risk neutrality; a ratio lower (greater) than unity suggests risk aversion
(seeking). Figures 1 and 2 display the CER mean and median for the two treatments in each
of the 10 lotteries; the latter are ordered on the x-axis from the least to the most risky.
In both treatments and for both measures used, the ratios are systematically below 1,
indicating that, using either mean or median CERs, the subjects appear consistently risk-
averse. Moreover, there is a downward trend in both the mean and the median CER as the
risk increases, even though the pattern is not monotonic. A closer look at the individual data
reveals that the variance in individual decisions across lotteries is rather high. This finding
is consistent with that of, e.g., James (2007), who estimates risk preference parameters on
15The estimations in Table 4 mirror qualitatively those in Table 3. Although in Table 4 participant 1 is clas-
sified as risk-loving, her ri -coefficient is the closest to one.
16We thank the referee who requested that we explore this issue.
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Fig. 1 Mean certainty-equivalent ratio in each of the 10 lotteries (ordered from the least to the most risky),
separately for the PI- and the II-treatment
Fig. 2 Median certainty-equivalent ratio in each of the 10 lotteries (ordered from the least to the most risky),
separately for the PI- and the II-treatment
a time series of data from the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, breaking the series
into four different regimes. According to his estimates, most subjects switch from risk aver-
sion to risk seeking behavior (or vice versa) in moving from one treatment regime to the
other.17 James explains this result by “choice error” and confusion on the part of the sub-
jects. Interestingly, in our experiment, individual CERs—though volatile—are always below
17Studies documenting risk preference parameter inconsistency across institutions, rather than within one
institution, are Isaac and James (2000) and Berg et al. (2005).
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Table 5 Summary statistics on contributions in the two treatments
Mean Median Std. dev. % of ci = 0 % of ci = 100
PI-treatment 78.08 100 35.33 9.06 65.94
II-treatment 40.75 40 35.30 25.31 12.81
Fig. 3 Standard deviations of contributions of individual subjects across periods in each treatment (the num-
ber on top of bars is the total number of subjects in the interval)
1 for (69%) 88% of the participants in the (PI-) II-treatment, thereby suggesting that most
participants behave as if their risk preferences were consistent.
3.2 Contribution behavior
Table 5 summarizes the experimental results under the two public goods treatments. Both
the mean and the median contributions differ between the two treatments: as compared to
a situation with perfect information, the presence of imperfect information about the public
good’s value significantly lowers average contributions (p = 0.001; two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum test; N = 16).18
There is also more full free-riding (contributions of zero) in the II-treatment than in
the PI-treatment (25.31% versus 9.06% overall). An exact binomial test rejects the null
hypothesis that the proportion of full free-riding is equal in both treatments, in favor of
the alternative that the proportion is significantly higher in the II-treatment (p < 0.001).
A Pearson χ2-test corroborates the robustness of the result (p < 0.001, χ2 = 15.55). This
evidence gives the first result concerning contribution behavior:
Result 3 Imperfect information significantly decreases average private contributions.
The average (over the 10 periods) standard deviation of contributions for individual sub-
jects is 22.36 in PI and 15.27 in II. Figure 3 displays the standard deviation of contributions
per subject, separately for the two treatments. More than 70% of the participants in II have
a standard deviation less than 20. Although the corresponding percentage is lower (about
18Unless otherwise stated, all statistical tests rely on independent group observations. Due to our matching
procedure (i.e., partners design), the number of statistically independent groups is N = 16 for both treatments.
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Fig. 4 Average contributions in each period, separately for the PI- and the II-treatment
40%) in PI, it increases to 71.8% when we exclude the last period, where twenty partici-
pants (63%) decrease their contribution dramatically.19 These findings can be summarized
as follows:
Result 4 Variation in contributions of individual subjects across periods 1 to 9 is smaller
in case of imperfect, rather than perfect, information.
Figure 4 illustrates the time path of average contributions in each treatment. First-period
behavior is particularly interesting as it shows how subjects act before receiving any feed-
back information about their partner (all individual responses are, thus, independent).
Figure 4 reveals that participants in II start out with significantly lower contributions than
participants in PI (a one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test delivers p < 0.001;N = 32). The
figure also indicates that average contributions stay roughly constant from the first until the
last but one period in both treatments. To support the latter statistically, we performed, sep-
arately for each treatment, a generalized linear mixed regression (based on a quasi-Poisson
distribution to model over-dispersion) with individual contribution decisions as the depen-
dent variable, and Period (taking values 1 to 10) and the dummy Last Period (which equals 0
for periods 1–9 and 1 for period 10) as independent variables. The model has random effects
at two levels: the 16 independent matching groups, and the 320 individual choices. The re-
gression results, reported in Table 6, confirm that there is no time trend in either treatment.20
19Not surprisingly, the variances in contribution between treatments differ significantly (p = 0.013; two-
sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test) if the tenth period is included in the sample. However, if period 10 is not
counted, the variances in PI and II are no longer significantly different (p = 0.955).
20This is at odds with the usual picture of a declining trend (Ledyard 1995) and may depend on our ex-
perimental design: interacting finitely often with the same partner may facilitate conditionally cooperative
behavior (more on this below).
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Independent variable Coefficient Std. error t-value p-value
PI-treatment
Constant 4.279 0.152 28.184 0.000
Period 0.007 0.007 0.944 0.346
Last Period –0.907 0.097 –9.307 0.000
II-treatment
Constant 3.171 0.303 10.456 0.000
Period 0.020 0.012 1.634 0.113
Last Period –0.395 0.129 –3.062 0.002
Moreover, the coefficient of Last Period is always negative and significant, capturing the
decline of contributions in the last period of both treatments.21 These observations lead to
our next result:
Result 5 First-period contributions are significantly lower in case of imperfect information.
The time trend of contributions is not different between treatments, though.
Since contribution patterns are qualitatively similar over periods, analyzing behavior in
the first period is crucial for shedding light on what triggers the significant quantitative
difference between treatments. In both information conditions, first-period individual con-
tributions and first-period individual beliefs are highly significantly correlated: Spearman
rank correlation coefficients are 0.83 in PI, and 0.80 in II (p < 0.001 in each treatment;
N = 32). As first-period contributions are significantly lower when information is imper-
fect, also first-period beliefs are significantly different between treatments (p = 0.004; one-
sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test; N = 32). Based on elicited beliefs about the counterpart’s
behavior, no subject expected full free-riding in the PI-treatment. In contrast, six subjects
had free-riding expectations in the II-treatment.
A possible interpretation of the lower contributions observed in the II-treatment at the
outset of the interaction may be that imperfect information affects initial beliefs: when con-
fronted with a risky situation, most participants become pessimistic about their co-player’s
contribution. A further interpretation is suggested by the “false consensus” hypothesis, ac-
cording to which people tend to believe that others behave similarly to themselves (Kelley
and Stahelski 1970). In this view, expectations of lower contributions may be triggered by
one’s own predisposition to contribute less. While our experiment is not designed to provide
insights into the determinants of beliefs, it clearly shows that a risky payoff has a negative
impact on willingness to contribute, and that first-period decisions are critical for future
average contribution levels.22 A justification for the significant difference in initial behav-
ior between treatments will be provided in the next subsection; it relates to subjects’ risk
preferences. For the moment, we sum up the evidence on first-period beliefs as follows:
21One-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing averages in the first nine periods and in the last period
corroborate the significant end-game effect in both treatments (p = 0.008 for both treatments; N = 16).
22The importance of first-period contributions to the whole game has been noticed also by Keser and van
Winden (2000), who compare partners and strangers conditions.
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Table 7 Generalized linear
mixed-effects regression on
individual contribution decisions
(relying on 640 observations)
Independent variable Coefficient Std. error t-value p-value
Constant 16.202 5.057 3.204 0.001
Expi 0.876 0.059 14.826 0.000
Info −16.539 5.200 −3.180 0.003
Period 0.927 0.679 1.366 0.172
Last Period −31.441 3.940 −7.979 0.000
Expi × Period −0.024 0.007 −3.357 0.001
Info × Expi 0.108 0.059 1.812 0.071
Info × Period 0.459 0.616 0.745 0.456
Info × Last Period 21.554 5.423 3.974 0.000
Result 6 First-period beliefs regarding the other’s contributions are significantly more pes-
simistic when information is imperfect rather than perfect. In both information conditions,
actual and expected contributions in period 1 are highly and positively correlated.
The last result of this subsection investigates whether the relationship between own and
expected contributions, detected in the first period, persists over the remaining repetitions of
each session/treatment. Before addressing this question, we note that, in all periods follow-
ing the first, beliefs may become endogenous in the sense of being influenced by the other’s
observed contributions (see González et al. 2005, and Fischbacher and Gächter 2006, for a
thorough discussion of this issue). To check whether this holds true in our experiment, we
performed a correlation analysis between beliefs in period t about the partner’s contribution
in t and the actual contribution of the partner in period t − 1. The analysis yields signifi-
cantly positive Spearman’s coefficients in both treatments (0.92 in PI, 0.98 in II; p < 0.001;
N = 16). Thus, participants in our experiment anchor their beliefs about the other’s contri-
butions on what the other did in the previous period. This is consistent with the work of, e.g.,
Neugebauer et al. (2008) who observe expectations to depend significantly on the partners’
one-period lagged contributions.
To analyze the relationship between beliefs and own contributions, Table 7 reports the
results of a generalized linear mixed regression with random effects for matching groups and
individuals. The dependent variable is individual i’s contribution decisions (ci). Regressors
are i’s expectations about her partner’s contribution in the current period (Expi ), a treatment
dummy variable (Info) that equals 0 for PI and 1 for the II, and the two variables included in
Table 6’s regression, i.e., the period index and the dummy for period 10.23 The specification
of the model includes the interaction of Info with Expi , Period and Last Period as well as
the interaction of Expi with Period.
Expected contributions have a significantly positive effect on own contributions, espe-
cially in the II-treatment (the coefficient of Info × Expi is positive and weakly significant).
However, the interaction variable Expi × Period indicates that this positive effect tends
to decrease over time. Since beliefs and observed contributions of the partner are highly
correlated, saying that contributions are related to beliefs is qualitatively equivalent to as-
serting that contributions in both treatments hinge on the other’s behavior in the previous
23We excluded from the regression the amount most recently contributed by i’s partner because of its cor-
relation with the variable Expi . Thus, although the other’s one-period lagged contribution is significantly
correlated with ci , if Expi is included in the regression it becomes insignificant.
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period. This result is in line with earlier studies (see, e.g., Croson 2000, 2007; Gächter and
Renner 2006; Neugebauer et al. 2008), and provides evidence for conditionally coopera-
tive behavior. The coefficient of Info is negative and significant, i.e. (as already summarized
by Result 3) participants in II contribute less than participants in PI. Finally, in line with
Result 5, the regression supports the absence of a time effect in both treatments, with the
exception of period 10 where contributions decline significantly. The next result sums up
the most interesting evidence from the regression analysis:
Result 7 In both information conditions, higher contributions are positively related to more
optimistic beliefs about the partner’s contributions.
To recapitulate the main findings of this subsection, the degree of information has no
impact on behavior during the game. Yet, imperfect information leads subjects to contribute
less at the outset of the game. The measured risk preference parameters may provide clues
as to the nature of this difference.
3.3 Relationship between risk attitude estimates and contribution behavior
To investigate how risk preference parameter estimates relate to contributions and whether
imperfect information affects such relationship, Table 8 documents the results of two OLS
regressions. The dependent variable is each individual’s average contribution over all 10
periods in Model 1, and each individual’s contribution in period 1 in Model 2. Indepen-
dent variables are an individual’s Pratt risk aversion coefficient ρ (as reported in Tables 2
and 3), the treatment dummy Info (being 0 in PI and 1 in II), and the interaction between
them.
Both models suggest a significantly negative relationship between contributions and the
calculated values of ρ : subjects with a larger ρ tend to contribute less both on average and in
the first period. Furthermore, Model 2—comprising period 1 only—shows a clear interaction
effect between risk parameters and information conditions: the coefficient of Pratt’s ρ ×
Info is negative and significant at the 5%-level, indicating that subjects who appear more
risk-averse exhibit lower first-period contributions when information is imperfect. Finally,
Table 8 Relationship between contributions and estimated risk parameter ρ (OLS regression)
Dependent variable: contributions
Model 1: Average Model 2: Period 1
Estimate Std. error p-value Estimate Std. error p-value
Constant 98.12 8.15 0.000 92.50 9.30 0.000
Pratt’s ρ −388.80 130.06 0.004 −427.80 148.40 0.005
Info −34.53 14.73 0.022 −19.40 16.80 0.007
Pratt’s ρ × Info −1076.83 740.9 0.151 −1800.6 845.60 0.037
Observations 64 64
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.329
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(in line with previous results) the dummy Info is always negative and significant.24 The key
findings of this analysis are summarized in last result:
Result 8 The estimated risk aversion parameters are negatively correlated with willingness
to contribute. There is an interaction between risk characteristics and information condi-
tions and this impacts first-period decisions.
4 Conclusions
This paper has provided experimental evidence on two main issues: the impact of imperfect
information on voluntary contribution behavior in linear public goods games, and the rela-
tionship between measures of risk attitudes and willingness to contribute. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate these issues, and hence to combine two hith-
erto unrelated strands of experimental work (namely, the one on risk preference parameter
estimates and the one on voluntary contributions).
The results indicate that, compared to a setting with perfect information, imperfect infor-
mation about a public good’s value significantly decreases cooperation, with average contri-
butions dropping from 78% to 41%. The basis for this difference is created in the first period:
a risky payoff has a negative impact on contributions at the start of the game, and first-period
contribution levels appear to be decisive for future contribution decisions. In fact, the time
trend of contributions does not differ between the two treatments, with conditional cooper-
ation being the most likely explanation of behavior in each of them. Thus, while on the one
hand this study confirms the findings of previous experiments establishing the importance
of conditionally cooperative behavior, on the other hand it provides the first evidence of a
significant negative effect of imperfect information on initial contributions.
The explanation this paper proposes for the significant behavioral difference detected
in the first period relies on people’s elicited risk aversion measures. The main result of
the analysis is that the larger a subject’s risk aversion coefficient, the less she contributes.
Moreover, this negative relationship is particularly pronounced in the first period of the
imperfect information treatment.
To conclude, the results reported here undermine the often claimed efficacy of the linear
voluntary contribution mechanism in one shot games or at the outset of finitely repeated
games, and suggest that it should be in the interest of politicians and firms involved in
privately financed public projects to ensure that individuals have good information about
their marginal benefits. Needless to say, much more work is necessary to assess the effect of
risk and uncertainty in other environments where cooperation is an issue.
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24Given that contributions are strongly positively related to beliefs, both in period 1 (see Result 6) and overall
periods (see Result 7), the findings of Table 8 do not qualitatively change using expected rather than actual
contributions as the response variable. As emphasized earlier, our experimental design abstains from disen-
tangling whether the measured risk parameters affect first beliefs and then contributions or vice versa (i.e.,
first own predisposition to cooperate and then, due to the false consensus hypothesis, beliefs).
Public Choice (2009) 138: 199–216 215
References
Bagnoli, M., & Lipman, B. L. (1989). Provision of public goods: fully implementing the core through private
contributions. Review of Economic Studies, 56, 583–602.
Berg, J. E., Dickhaut, J. W., & McCabe, K. (2005). Risk preference instability across institutions: a dilemma.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102, 4209–4214.
Brennan, G., González, L., Güth, W., & Levati, M. V. (2008). Attitudes toward private and collective risk in
individual and strategic choice situations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 253–262.
Coricelli, G., Fehr, D., & Fellner, G. (2004). Partner selection in public goods experiments. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 48, 356–378.
Croson, R. (2000). Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 41, 299–314.
Croson, R. (2007). Theories of altruism and reciprocity: evidence from linear public goods games. Economic
Inquiry, 45, 199–216.
Cubitt, R., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1998). On the validity of random lottery incentive mechanism. Exper-
imental Economics, 1, 115–132.
Dawes, R. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.
Di Mauro, C., & Maffioletti, A. (2004). Attitudes to risk and attitudes to uncertainty: experimental evidence.
Applied Economics, 36, 357–372.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Schupp, J., Sunde, U., & Wagner, G. G. (2006). Individual risk attitudes:
new evidence from a large, representative, experimentally-validated survey (C.E.P.R. Discussion Paper
No. 5517). London.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10,
171–178.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public
goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71, 397–404.
Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2006). Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in
public goods (Working Paper No. 261). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of
Zurich.
Gächter, S., & Renner, E. (2006). The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public good experiments
(CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2006-16). University of Nottingham.
González, L., González-Farías, G., & Levati, M. V. (2005). Logit estimation of conditional cooperation in
a repeated public goods experiment (Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction No. 05-2005). Max
Planck Institute of Economics, Jena.
Gradstein, M., Nitzan, S., & Slutsky, S. (1994). Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with
incomplete information. Economics Letters, 46, 69–75.
Hey, J. D., & Orme, C. (1994). Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimental
data. Econometrica, 62, 1291–1326.
Hey, J. D., Morone, A., & Schmidt, U. (2006). Noise and bias in eliciting preferences (Mimeo). University
of Bari.
Holt, C. A. (1986). Preference reversals and the independence axiom. American Economic Review, 76, 508–
515.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 92,
1644–1655.
Isaac, R. M., & James, D. (2000). Just who are you calling risk averse? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20,
177–187.
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., & Thomas, S. H. (1984). Divergent evidence on free riding: an experimental
examination of possible explanations. Public Choice, 43, 113–149.
James, D. (2007). Stability of risk preference parameter estimates within the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak pro-
cedure. Experimental Economics, 10, 123–141.
Kachelmeier, S. J., & Shehata, M. (1992). Examining risk preferences under high monetary incentives: ex-
perimental evidence from the people’s republic of China. American Economic Review, 82, 1120–1141.
Kachelmeier, S. J., & Shehata, M. (1994). Examining risk preferences under high monetary incentives: reply.
American Economic Review, 84, 1105–1106.
Karni, E., & Safra, Z. (1987). Preference reversal and the observability of preferences by experimental meth-
ods. Econometrica, 55, 675–685.
Kelley, H., & Stahelski, A. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about
others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 190–197.
Keser, C., & van Winden, F. (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102, 23–39.
216 Public Choice (2009) 138: 199–216
Ledyard, J. O., (1995). Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In J. H. Kagel, & A. E. Roth
(Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics (Chap. 2, pp. 111–194). Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Levati, M. V., & Neugebauer, T. (2004). An application of the English clock market mechanism to public
goods games. Experimental Economics, 7, 153–169.
Marks, M., & Croson, R. (1999). The effect of incomplete information in a threshold public goods game.
Public Choice, 99, 103–118.
Menezes, F. M., Monteiro, P. K., & Temimi, A. (2001). Private provision of discrete public goods with
incomplete information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 35, 493–514.
Morone, A., & Schmidt, U. (2008). An experimental investigation of alternatives to expected utility using
pricing data. Economics Bulletin, 4, 1–12.
Neugebauer, T., Perote, J., Schmidt, U., & Loos, M. (2008). Self-biased conditional cooperation: on the
decline of cooperation in repeated public goods experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 32, 122–136.
Rabin, M., & Thaler, R. H. (2001). Anomalies. Risk aversion. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 219–
232.
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s dilemma: a study in conflict and cooperation. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Shogren, J., Shin, S., Hayes, D., & Kliebenstein, J. (1994). Resolving differences in willingness to pay and
willingness to accept. American Economic Review, 84, 255–270.
Shupp, R., & Williams, A. (2008). Risk preference differentials of small groups and individuals. Economic
Journal, 118, 258–283.
Staffiero, G. (2006). Helping the meaner, hurting the nicer: the contribution versus distribution game (IESE
Research Papers No. 652). University of Navarra, Spain.
van Dijk, E., & Grodzka, M. (1992). The influence of endowments asymmetry and information level on the
contribution to a public-step good. Journal of Economic Psychology, 13, 329–342.
van Dijk, E., Wilke, H., Wilke, M., & Metman, L. (1999). What information do we use in social dilemmas?
Environmental uncertainty and the employment of coordination rules. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 35, 109–135.
Wakker, P. P. (2008). Explaining the characteristics of the power (CRRA) utility family. Health Economics,
uncorrected proof published online in www.interscience.wiley.com.
Walker, J., & Halloran, M. (2004). Rewards and sanctions and the provision of public goods in one shot
settings. Experimental Economics, 7, 235–247.
